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Abstract 
Philosophy always unites the divided: the finite and infinite, fathomable and 
unfathomable, created and creator, Man and God. Whenever I think, my thought unites 
what must remain divided: immanence and transcendence, consistency and 
inconsistency, European originality and American horizontality. Art and philosophy 
indicate the contingent nature of reality. They generate resistance against established 
realities and the dispositives that organize them. Their aim is not to flee from reality but 
rather to intensify contact with reality by maintaining a distance to it. 
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Happiness 
François Jullien demonstrated that the idea of happiness was among the least 
questioned premises in Western thought. As long as this idea remains tied to a 
vision of a goal in order to inscribe itself in a teleology with a happy ending, it 
will belong to the Europeanism of the happy life, which “singled out the idea of 
happiness from the continuity of process and set it forth as ‘the desirable’ par 
excellence.” As always, Jullien approaches the deconstruction of one of the core 
categories of the European history of ideas from the outside, taking a detour 
through China, which did not undergo the separation of day-to-day living and 
the desire for happiness in order to nurture life independent of happiness. 
Nurturing life away from happiness means living it without any particular idea of 
happiness, beyond the dramaturgy of unfulfilled desire, without the 
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romanticization of happiness. One thing that’s notable about this comparison 
between European goal-orientedness/purposefulness and Chinese 
purposelessness/goallessness is that it leaves unmentioned the emergence of a 
conception of happiness within the field of Western philosophy that is freed from 
the categories of sense, from determination, and from telos. Nietzsche 
reactivated the antique and Spinozistic heritage of an immanence of beatitudo in 
the materialistic horizon of existence. Spinozistic/Nietzschean affirmationism, 
saying yes to life in its unliveableness, would be another strain of Western 
thought that locates happiness within its incommensurability—instead of 
construing it as beyond life. Being happy simply means living. There is no life 
beyond life, beyond its violence and unliveableness.  
 
Confinement 
Has anyone ever done more violence to logos than to confine it in the prison 
known as logic? And what if the speech, language, or reason known as logos 
were convicted of the inconsistency of its promise known as logic? Among 
heretics, an exactingness caused by excess is proper to thought, which tempts 
logos to break with its principles. Thinking means showing logos its own fragility.  
 
Enlightenment 
Should we call enlightenment the thing that spreads “trace elements of reason 
... through the world,” or is it “trace elements of chaos ... that bring forth 
enlightenment”? Alexander Kluge directs this question at Heiner Müller, who 
recognizes that it is the “purpose of intelligence” “to create chaos” in order to 
“question all illusions, all coalitions, and all alliances.” Ultimately, the point is to 
complicate the opposition between reason and chaos. What else does reason do 
than bring chaos into the world, and what does chaos produce if not the 
hyperreasonable questioning of this chaos of reason, which is rationalistic 
totalism? The dialectic of enlightenment causes reason and chaos to interact in a 
way that does not privilege either side. We’ve gotten used to describing the birth 
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of logos out of chaos or myth as the emancipation of thought from the irrational. 
At the same time, we know that the emergence of reason in the prerational 
sphere of chaos represented a violent event that generated chaotic effects. 
Translated into the system of nature/culture, that means that we distance 
ourselves from the myth of a culture that substitutes for “wild” nature, and 
cannot simply switch over to an opposing ideology of nature robbed of its 
“innocence” by culture. Nature isn’t wild, pure, or innocent; nor is culture 
civilizing or violent. To formulate it as primitively as possible: one isn’t better 
than the other. Nature isn’t good, culture isn’t bad; nor vice versa. 
Enlightenment begins with the suspension of these anthropomorphisms. 
Articulating oneself beyond good and evil is part of complexity. The interest-
oriented, strategic, or irrational violence, brutality, and horror that happen in the 
name of (generally fascistic) naturalism and (ideological, religious) culturalism is 
the product of the subject’s exit from the dialectic of enlightenment. Instead of 
acting at the level of its world’s complexity, it reduces this complexity in favor of 
one-sidedness that it calls truth or justice. Should it make sense to speak of 
truth or justice in this context, then the dialectic of enlightenment teaches us 
that they are on the side of complexity rather than one-sidedness.  
 
Courage 
In Kant’s essay What Is Enlightenment? (1784), Michel Foucault recognized a 
“call to courage.” The famed challenge—addressed to all of humanity—to emerge 
from immaturity implies a sapere aude: the courage to think, the emancipation 
from subjection to the thinking of others. Kant is touching on the human ability 
to become conscious of one’s own heteronomy in order to—gradually—free 
oneself from it. In the context of further considerations that stray from Kant, 
Foucault spoke of the “courage of the truth,” which is tantamount to his 
definition of philosophical thought. The courage of the truth turns out to be the 
courage of thinking. The act of thinking—which includes processuality and 
interminability—includes working on the truth, “analysis of the relations between 
the subject and truth: that of relations of power and their role in the interplay 
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between the subject and truth.” The courage of truth must question the 
instrumentalization of the truth and its fusion with established power. Far from 
dismissing truth as a metaphysical concept—and with and without Kant— 
Foucault defines the task of his thought as the analysis of the truth. Courage 
demands this analysis, if only because as a critical project, it cannot trust any 
simple solutions— as far as the alliance between knowledge and power goes, for 
example. Strictly speaking, it can’t trust anything. The courage of truth is 
inherent in the tradition of enlightenment not only in the form of a challenge, 
but also as problem and aporia. You could call Foucault the thinker of this 
inherence. His entire body of thought expresses consciousness of the aporia of 
thought concerning the truth. This is why it is thought—because thinking doesn’t 
mean searching for solutions. Thinking means working through problems that 
elude solvability. Kant was also clear on this. The subject is in a bind. That’s 
what the subject’s humanity consists in: being in contact with questions and 
problems that it can neither dismiss nor solve. And that’s what requires courage.  
 
Pathos 
Thinking that thinks itself—the self-reflection of the logos, the cogito, or the 
subject—implies the veritable pathos of reason. There is no doctrine of reason 
that is not a doctrine of emotion. The reasoning subject cannot think itself 
without being confronted with its own fragmentation, the pain that belongs to 
self-awareness. The Ancient Greek verb páschein means to suffer or to endure—
and what is suffering other than an experience that pushes the subject to its 
limits? Pathos expresses the experience of unresolvable conflict, which is why 
there is no philosophy that isn’t pathetic in this sense. It may be a matter of the 
discreet pathos of mathematical thinking, or lines of argument strained to their 
breaking point. It may be the polemic pathos of reason run riot, which we are 
familiar with from Nietzsche’s final books and Artaud’s strident invectives (from 
his “animalistic and superhuman, shrieking, shrill, brutal” speech). The pathos of 
dry subjects, abstraction, sobriety, and coldness also expresses the pain of 
thought, in which it “loses itself,” as Hegel says. Thinking means getting lost 
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again and again. The self grinds itself down on its conflicts instead of 
synthesizing them dialectically. The movement of reason traces its restlessness. 
Thinking is a passion that makes the subject tremble in the face of truths that 
undermine its realities. 
 
Stinging eyes 
To look truth in the face—that is the cliché of thought because it can only do so 
in the face of a truth that remains faceless. “What thing,” asks Jean-Luc Nancy, 
“can be looked at directly in the face? If looking something ‘in the face’ means 
seeing its ‘truth’ or ‘evidence,’ then there is never any direct face-to-face. Every 
face is a bedazzlement, terrible and marvelous.” We know that Lacan calls the 
faceless face of the truth the real. Freud speaks of the unconscious, Heidegger of 
being that collapses into nothingness as nonbeing. There is no philosopher who 
hasn’t found their own term for the truth without a face. Plato evokes the image 
of the shining sun. Burning light that stings the eyes. The sun inflames and 
irritates the subject. If it does not cause blindness, then at least it bedazzles. 
Like Freud’s unconscious, Lacan’s real, and Heidegger’s being, it does not give of 
itself fully; it withdraws and withholds itself. It doesn’t divulge itself directly. The 
subject communicates with these entities only at the cost of relative blindness. 
The truth generates a subject with stinging eyes. You can also refer to “reddened 
eyes,” as Rancière does in a commentary on Deleuze. With Deleuze, chaos 
blinds the subject and causes it to slide. What Deleuze and Guattari, together 
with Nietzsche, call chaos can be interpreted as a translation of the Lacanian real 
into the dispositive of immanent thought. The planes of immanence lie like a 
filter or a “screen” over chaos. They muffle the contact with nothingness. Just as 
the antique logos already represented a neutralizing figure for the alogon, the 
immanence filter lies over the faceless chaos of truth in order to give it a face 
that stings the subject’s eyes less. To look truth in the face means assenting to 
being blinded, which promises some minimum of insight. This perhaps 
impossible promise is the promise that philosophy makes to itself. 
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